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TURNER-ING OVER A NEW LEAF: PRE-
CHARGE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS AS A 
CRITICAL STAGE FOR THE PURPOSES  
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT  
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Abstract: On February 15, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach to 
pre-charge plea negotiations. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit upheld a bright-
line rule that the right to counsel does not attach until formal charges have 
been filed. Two months later, on April 13, 2017, the Sixth Circuit vacated its 
opinion and granted a rehearing en banc. This Comment argues that pre-
charge plea negotiations should be considered a critical stage for the purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment, and thus defendants should have a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel at these points in the legal process. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of 
the accused to have the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.1 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this right to attach during all “criti-
cal stages” of criminal proceedings.2 Critical stages are the points at which 
adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated.3 To determine whether 
a stage is critical for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, courts in some 
circuits employ a bright-line rule, while others reject this approach.4 In prac-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984) (rec-
ognizing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 
 2 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012) (the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
applies at all critical stages of criminal proceedings); see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 
(1972) (finding that critical stages include formal charges, preliminary hearings, indictments, 
information, or arraignments). An information is when a defendant is charged without a grand jury 
indictment. Information, LAW.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=953 [https://
perma.cc/U7F2-33M8]. 
 3 See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688 (finding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at or 
after the initiation of “adversary judicial proceedings”). 
 4 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 675 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that without 
being “the subject of a formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraign-
ment,” the Sixth Amendment does not apply, including when a defendant, who has not been for-
mally accused, is a target of a grand jury investigation); Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the right to counsel could conceivably attach prior to formal charges, 
indictment, or arraignment in extremely limited circumstances when the government crosses the 
line from fact-finder to adversary); United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(finding that “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until or after the time formal 
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tice, this bright-line rule effectively means that the right to counsel does not 
attach until after formal charges have been filed.5 In 2017, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Turner v. United States (Turner I) followed 
circuit precedent in applying this bright-line rule to conclude that the de-
fendant lacked a valid claim for the ineffective assistance of counsel be-
cause he did not have the right to counsel during pre-charge plea negotia-
tions.6 Shortly after the Sixth Circuit decided Turner I, the court vacated its 
opinion and granted a rehearing en banc, indicating that the Sixth Circuit 
might reconsider the facts of Turner I and align its reasoning with the other 
Circuits that interpret Supreme Court precedent to allow for the pre-
indictment attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.7 This 
Comment argues that pre-charge plea negotiations analogous to those that 
occurred in Turner I are a critical stage where the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel should attach.8 Part I of this Comment provides the factual and pro-
cedural background for Turner I.9 Part II considers the differing opinions 
about when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, with some cir-
cuits adhering to a bright-line rule and other circuits carving out excep-
tions.10 Part III argues that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should 
attach during pre-charge plea-bargaining because it is a critical stage for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment.11 
                                                                                                                           
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated”); Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 1319 
(D. Del. 1981) (concluding that there are scenarios when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
can attach prior to the filing of formal charges). A bright-line rule is an objective test that produces 
predictable results. Bright-Line Rule, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.
edu/wex/bright-line_rule [https://perma.cc/GG3E-PV4K]. 
 5 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986) (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel does not attach until after the filing of formal charges); Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1291 (ac-
knowledging extremely limited exceptions to the bright-line rule that the right to counsel does not 
attach until a defendant is formally charged). The right to counsel does not attach until after the 
government has committed itself to prosecution and established its adversarial position. See Mo-
ran, 475 U.S. at 432. 
 6 Turner v. United States (Turner I), 848 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2017). Turner I followed the 
precedent established in United States v. Moody, which held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach until after the filing of formal charges. Id. at 770–71; see United States v. 
Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 7 Turner v. United States (Turner II), 865 F.3d 338, 338 (6th Cir. 2017) (granting re-hearing 
en banc). There are indications that upon rehearing Turner I the Sixth Circuit will find that the 
right to counsel can attach pre-indictment. See United States v. Pina, No. 1:17-cr-08, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 135238, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2017). 
 8 See infra notes 76–117 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 12–30 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 31–75 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 76–117 and accompanying text. 
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF TURNER V. UNITED STATES 
 Section A of this Part will establish the relevant factual background of 
Turner I.12 Section B of this Part will provide Turner I’s procedural history.13 
A. Factual Background 
On October 3, 2007, John Turner robbed four businesses at gunpoint in 
Memphis, Tennessee and was later arrested by a state officer working on a 
federal-state anticrime task force.14 Turner retained attorney Mark McDan-
iel for the state proceedings and was indicted under Tennessee law for four 
counts of aggravated robbery.15 These state charges were resolved through a 
plea agreement in March 2009.16 At some point during the summer of 2008, 
while McDaniel was still representing Turner on the state charges, a district 
attorney informed McDaniel that the U.S. Attorney’s Office intended to 
bring federal charges, arising from the same incidences, against Turner.17 
Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Tony Arvin told McDaniel that 
he would offer Turner a plea deal of fifteen years on the federal charges, so 
long as Turner accepted the offer before the federal indictment was re-
turned.18 McDaniel contended that he presented the federal plea deal to 
Turner in a timely manner, but Turner rejected it.19 Turner subsequently dis-
charged McDaniel and hired new representation.20 A new AUSA was also 
assigned to Turner’s case.21 The best plea deal Turner’s new attorney could 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 14–24 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. 
 14 Turner I, 848 F.3d at 768. In federal-state joint taskforces, local and federal officers work 
in tandem to achieve a shared goal, and federal and local prosecutors will work together to bring 
charges against the individuals arrested by the taskforce. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, 
The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 
1095, 1124–25 (1995) (noting that state prosecutors in organized crime investigations often work 
with federal prosecutors who have greater bargaining power as a result of the federal sentencing 
guidelines). 
 15 Turner I, 848 F.3d at 768. 
 16 Id. The plea deal offered to Turner on the state charges was a negotiated sentence of eight 
or nine years. Id. 
 17 Id. at 769. McDaniel was informed that Arvin intended to charge Turner under the Hobbs 
Act for interference with commerce by threats or violence and for using a firearm during a violent 
crime for each of the four robberies. Id. The mandatory minimum sentence for the federal charges 
alone was eighty-two years. Id. 
 18 Id. The charges against Turner were to be presented to a federal grand jury on September 
15, 2008. Id. 
 19 Id. Turner did not dispute that he did not timely accept the offer, but he did dispute the 
exact events that transpired between McDaniel and Turner regarding the initial plea offer. Id. 
McDaniel claims that Turner rejected the deal because Turner believed a sentence of fifteen years 
was too long for his actions. Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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negotiate with the new AUSA was a twenty-five-year sentence for the fed-
eral charges.22 Turner accepted the deal and pled guilty to the federal charg-
es in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.23 As a 
condition of the plea agreement, Turner waived his right to a direct appeal.24 
B. Procedural History 
In 2012, Turner filed a motion to vacate or set aside his conviction 
based on a claim that his attorney for the state proceedings, Mark McDan-
iel, provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the federal plea nego-
tiations.25 The government argued that counsel could not be ineffective be-
cause Turner had no right to counsel during the plea negotiations that oc-
curred prior to the filing of formal charges.26 The district court agreed and 
denied Turner’s motion without ruling on the merits, holding that the right 
to counsel had not attached during the federal pre-charge plea negotia-
tions.27 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s decision, as required by circuit precedent.28 Two months later, the 
Sixth Circuit vacated the decision and granted a rehearing en banc.29 Turner 
I has since been restored to the docket as a pending appeal.30 
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. Turner pled guilty to four counts of robbery affecting commerce in violation of the 
Hobbs Act and one count of using and carrying a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime. Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. A waiver of a right to appeal bars a defendant from being able to appeal part of his or 
her conviction, often including his or her sentence. Leanna C. Minix, Examining Rule 11(b)(1)(n) 
Error: Guilty Pleas, Appellate Waiver, and Dominguez Benitez, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 551, 
553 (2017). Although the use of appellate waivers in guilty pleas is increasingly more common, 
and all circuits have upheld waivers as constitutional, it is not without some hesitation. See id. at 
566 (noting that debates over the use of appellate waivers in guilty pleas include balancing issues 
of efficiency and fairness). A former U.S. federal judge argued that a defendant should not be able to 
use their right to appeal as a bargaining chip, citing concerns about the unequal power balance be-
tween defendants and prosecutors. Nancy Gertner, Having the Right to Appeal Is an Issue of Fair-
ness, N.Y. Times (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:36 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/08/19/do-
prosecutors-have-too-much-power/having-the-right-to-appeal-is-an-issue-of-fairness [https://perma.
cc/PP8Z-J2RM]. 
 25 Turner I, 848 F.3d 769. Turner’s motion to vacate or set aside his conviction was filed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. at 768. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not 
raised on direct appeal but are properly raised on a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 
United States v. Maddox, 69 F. App’x 663, 665–66 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding a defendant who 
waived his right to appeal properly asserted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a motion 
to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 
 26 Turner I, 848 F.3d at 768. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 773. The district court relied on Moody to draw its conclusion in Turner I. Id. The 
Moody court upheld the bright-line test, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does 
not attach until after the filing of formal charges. Moody, 206 F.3d at 614. 
 29 Turner II, 865 F.3d at 338. 
 30 Id. at 339. 
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WHEN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT  
RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHES 
The Sixth Amendment affords the accused the right to the assistance of 
counsel for his or her defense in all criminal prosecutions.31 The assistance 
of counsel is a safeguard that the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed necessary 
to ensure the fundamental rights of life and liberty, and is so vital in the ad-
versarial trial system that without it justice cannot be done.32 Because the 
skills and knowledge of an attorney are necessary to ensure a fair trial and 
just results, the right to counsel is only satisfied when the assistance of 
counsel is effective.33 The point at which a defendant is entitled to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel depends on whether the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel has attached at a given stage of the criminal proceeding.34 Section A 
of this Part details the bright-line rule, which has been used to determine 
whether a defendant’s right to counsel has attached.35 Section B of this Part 
discusses how circuit courts have interpreted and applied this bright-line 
rule.36 Section C of this Part addresses the right to counsel specifically as it 
pertains to plea negotiations.37 
A. The Bright-Line Rule for the Right to Counsel 
The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel only attaches at “critical” stages of criminal proceedings that occur “at 
or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated.”38 
A stage is considered critical when the government has committed itself to 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). See generally Mary Fan, Adversarial 
Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. L. REV. 775, 794 (2014) (in-
dicating that the right to counsel arose as a response to the historical imbalances of power between 
defendant and state). 
 32 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). The role of counsel is so crucial that 
defendants accused of federal or state crimes have the right to appointed counsel if they are unable 
to afford to retain their own. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. 
 33 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685–86. 
 34 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 138 (2012) (finding that the right to counsel and the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel are intertwined); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (finding 
that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel” (quoting McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)); Turner I, 848 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding 
that a defendant who did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not entitled to an evi-
dentiary hearing for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 35 See infra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 50–63 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 64–75 and accompanying text. 
 38 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). 
Critical stages can exist beyond the trial itself, and some may occur pre-trial. See, e.g., Argersing-
er v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (holding that counsel is needed for guilty pleas); Hamilton v. 
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961) (holding that an arraignment is a critical stage in state crimi-
nal proceedings, and the accused is entitled to counsel during arraignment). 
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prosecute, thereby establishing its adverse position against the defendant, and 
the defendant is faced with the “intricacies of criminal law.”39 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to not attach until 
after formal charges have been filed.40 This method for determining when the 
right to counsel attaches is often referred to by courts and scholars as a 
bright-line rule.41 Supreme Court justices, circuit courts, and scholars have 
failed, however, to reach a consensus regarding at what stages the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches.42  
It is currently ambiguous whether the right to counsel can attach prior 
to the filing of formal charges.43 Although the Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that the right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of ad-
versarial judicial proceedings, the Court in 1964 in Escobedo v. Illinois rec-
ognized the right to counsel for defendants pre-indictment but post-arrest.44 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689–90; see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986) (finding that 
only when the government establishes an accusatory and adversarial position against the defendant 
does the defendant need assistance from someone with knowledge of the complexities of the law). 
 40 See Moran, 475 U.S. at 431 (interpreting Supreme Court case law to affirm that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after the filing of formal charges). 
 41 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 770–71; Steven J. Mulroy, The Bright Line’s Dark Side: Pre-
Charge Attachment of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 92 WASH. L. REV. 213, 215 (2017) 
(noting that the bright-line rule for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is traceable to United 
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984), and compels either a formal charge or an appearance 
before a judge to trigger the right). 
 42 Compare United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 676 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the de-
fendant did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a pre-indictment deposition bec-
uase he was not formally charged at the time), with Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 
F.3d 877, 892–93 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel during pre-charge conversations, reasoning that the right to counsel is not necessarily 
predicated on a formal charge but rather on when the defendant is confronted by a judicial adver-
sary). See Mulroy, supra note 41, at 216–17 (noting that currently five circuit courts, including the 
D.C. Circuit, abide by the bright-line rule and four circuits have rejected the rule in some form). 
The court in Brewer v. Williams stated, “[w]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted 
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a 
lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him—‘whether by 
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’” 430 U.S. 
387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689) (emphasis added). According to Justice Stevens 
in his Gouveia concurrence, this statement does not foreclose the possibility that the right to coun-
sel may under certain circumstances attach prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings. 467 U.S. 
at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was convinced that the Gouveia majority adopted 
a broader rule than was obligated by precedent in finding that the right to counsel attaches only at 
or after the initiation of criminal proceedings. Id. Justice Stevens did not join the opinion of the 
Court in part because he did not believe that this broad interpretation was justified by prior cases. 
Id. 
 43 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 770–71. 
 44 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964). But see Moran, 475 U.S. at 429–30 
(reasoning that Escobedo’s Sixth Amendment analysis was not only dictum, but it also supported 
an understanding that the Moran court considered it to be in conflict with the U.S. Supreme 
Court). In Escobedo, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches pre-
indictment, but post-arrest, during interrogations. See 378 U.S. at 490–91. The Court determined 
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Lower courts have also raised concerns about the implications of the bright-
line rule, including instances when the accused must navigate the adversari-
al judicial system before formal charges are filed.45 In fact, circuit courts are 
split as to whether the right to counsel can attach pre-indictment.46 Some 
circuits, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, follow 
the bright-line rule.47 Other circuits have moved away from upholding this 
rigid test.48 How courts approach this issue can have serious consequences, 
considering a defendant’s right to trial can be at stake during pre-charge 
stages, and absent counsel the average defendant is not readily able to navi-
gate the process on his or her own.49 
                                                                                                                           
that this point in time was a critical stage where the assistance of counsel is vital, as evidenced by 
the many confessions that are obtained by law enforcement during this period. See id. at 488. 
Considering the interrogation stage is one that law enforcement uses to obtain confessions, it is 
critical that the accused is provided counsel. See id. Escobedo has since been interpreted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to be a Fifth Amendment case, despite its multiple references to the Sixth 
Amendment. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 429–30; Mulroy, supra note 41, at 225. Its criticism of the 
rigidity of the pre-or post-formal charge distinction, however, is nonetheless relevant. See Mulroy, 
supra note 41, at 225–26. Numerous cases have since reaffirmed that the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel does not attach until after the initiation of judicial proceedings. See Gouveia, 467 U.S. 
at 188; Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469–470 (1981); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226–27 
(1977); Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398–99. 
 45 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773 (the bright-line rule does not allow for the “realities of pre-
sent-day prosecutions and their heavy reliance on plea bargaining”); United States v. Moody, 206 
F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding the bright-line rule even though “the facts so clearly 
demonstrate that the rights protected by the Sixth Amendment are endangered” when a suspect 
was denied counsel during pre-indictment plea negotiations). 
 46 Turner I, 848 F.3d at 771. Compare Kennedy v. United States, 756 F.3d 492, 493 (6th Cir. 
2014) (holding that the defendant did not have a right to counsel during pre-indictment plea nego-
tiations, thereby affirming that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until formal 
charges have been filed), with Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (1st Cir. 1995) (interpret-
ing Supreme Court jurisprudence to allow for limited exceptions to the bright-line rule, such as 
when the government has shifted from investigator to accuser). 
 47 See, e.g., Moody, 206 F.3d at 614 (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does 
not attach until after the filing of formal charges). Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until or after the 
time formal adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated.” United States v. Heinz, 983 F.2d 
609, 612 (5th Cir. 1993). Further, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that a defendant was not protected by the Sixth Amendment when he was a target of a grand jury 
investigation, without having been arrested, because he was not “the subject of a formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.” Hayes, 231 F.3d at 675. See gener-
ally Mulroy, supra note 41. 
 48 See Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1291 (recognizing that the right to counsel could conceivably attach 
prior to formal charges, indictment, or arraignment in extremely limited circumstances when the 
government crosses the line from fact-finder to adversary); Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. Supp. 1312, 
1319 (D. Del. 1981) (concluding that there are scenarios when the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel can attach prior to the filing of formal charges, including plea negotiations that demon-
strate the government is committed to prosecution, establishing the government’s adversary posi-
tion). 
 49 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773 (finding that the average defendant is ill-equipped to navigate 
the complexities of the plea process and sentencing guidelines on his or her own); Pamela R. 
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B. Circuit Court Support for the Attachment of the Sixth Amendment  
Right to Counsel Prior to Formal Charges 
Four circuit courts, as well as multiple district courts, break from the 
bright-line rule and suggest that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may 
exist prior to the filing of formal charges.50 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the opportunity for the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel to attach pre-charge.51 In 1992, in United States v. Larkin, the 
Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a defendant has a right to 
counsel during a pre-indictment lineup.52 The Larkin court determined that 
in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent there was a presumption that the 
right to counsel does not attach at pre-indictment line-ups; that presump-
tion, however, could be rebutted if the government had crossed the line 
from fact-finder to adversary.53 
Similarly, in 1995 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
Roberts v. Maine recognized that the right to counsel could conceivably at-
tach prior to formal charges when the government crosses the line from 
fact-finder to adversary.54 The First Circuit acknowledged that there are 
very limited circumstances where this line is crossed, but the mere fact that 
the court left open the possibility is an indicator that although a bright-line 
rule has traditionally been used, exceptions exist.55 Therefore, if the gov-
ernment has taken an adversarial position, the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel could conceivably attach prior to formal charges.56 
                                                                                                                           
Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1635, 1666 (2003) (arguing that it is unlikely that individuals who enter into pre-charge negotia-
tions without counsel understand the risks of providing certain information during conversations 
nor are uncounseled individuals likely to understand the federal sentencing system or what protec-
tions to ask for); Minix, supra note 24, at 556 (noting that when defendants enter a guilty plea, 
they surrender their constitutional right to trial by jury); James S. Montana & John A. Galotto, 
Right to Counsel: Courts Adhere to Bright-Line Limits, 16 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2011, at 4, 12 
(arguing that the federal sentencing guidelines incentivize pre-indictment plea bargaining). 
 50 See infra notes 51–63 and accompanying text; see also Mulroy, supra note 41 (providing a 
general overview of case law that supports attaching the Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior 
to the filing of formal charges). 
 51 United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 969 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. The right to counsel only attaches when the government is seeking to gain incriminating 
evidence, and not when information is being gathered in a “nonadversarial atmosphere.” See Unit-
ed States ex rel. Hall v. Lane, 804 F.2d 79, 82–83 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting DeAngelo v. Wain-
wright, 781 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 54 See Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1290–91 (holding that a defendant who was not allowed to call his 
attorney before a pre-charge blood/alcohol test did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
because the government was not committed to prosecuting him at that time). 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. (recognizing the possibility that a defendant could have a pre-charge right to counsel 
if the government has shifted from investigator to accuser); Larkin, 978 F.2d at 969 (reasoning 
that a defendant who was denied counsel during a pre-indictment lineup could rebut the presump-
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also interprets Su-
preme Court precedent to not necessarily require a formal charge before the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.57 Rather, in 1998 in United 
States v. Burgess, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s 1977 
decision in Moore v. Illinois not to require an indictment to indicate the ini-
tiation of criminal proceedings, but rather held that the right to counsel at-
taches at the point that the government is committed to prosecution.58 
Comparably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that 
the right to counsel may attach at stages that occur prior to the filing of 
formal charges.59 In the Third Circuit, the critical triggering point for the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the moment that a defendant is “faced 
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and [is] immersed in the 
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.”60 In 1999, in Matteo 
v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, the defendant was brought into custody 
without a formal indictment or the filing of an information.61 The Matteo 
court found that in this scenario the right to counsel had attached when the 
defendant was arrested because he was confronted by the “organized re-
sources of an ongoing police investigation,” even though he had not yet 
been formally charged.62 
Collectively, the reasoning of these four Circuits establishes support 
for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to formal charges at points 
when the accused is faced with the intricacies of criminal law, when the 
government has taken up an adversarial position, and/or when the govern-
ment has committed itself to prosecution.63 
                                                                                                                           
tion of no right to counsel by showing that the government took on an adversarial position at that 
point). 
 57 See United States v. Burgess, No. 96-4505, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6515, at *3–4 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 30, 1998) (holding that a defendant was not entitled to counsel during a post-arrest but pre-
indictment lineup where he was identified as a bank robbery suspect). 
 58 See id. (reasoning that Supreme Court precedent does not require an indictment to indicate 
when criminal proceedings have been initiated but rather the right to counsel attaches when the 
government has solidified its adversarial position); see also Moore, 434 U.S. at 228 (reasoning 
that it is an incorrect interpretation of Kirby to find that the right to counsel only attaches after a 
defendant is indicted). 
 59 See Matteo, 171 F.3d at 892–93. 
 60 See id. (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689). In Matteo, the court held that the defendant was 
faced with adversarial prosecutorial forces, and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached, 
when his phone conversations were recorded while he was in prison as a result of an arrest war-
rant, even though an information had not yet been filed, nor did he have a preliminary hearing or 
arraignment. Id. at 893–94. 
 61 Id. at 893–94. 
 62 See id. at 893. 
 63 See supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Plea Negotiations 
Whereas circuit courts differ as to whether there is a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel during pre-charge plea negotiations, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that the right to counsel extends to plea negotiations general-
ly.64 For the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, the negotiation and ac-
ceptance of a plea deal is considered a critical stage.65 Plea negotiations are 
central to the criminal justice system, and the accused has a right to counsel 
during these critical stages.66 In fact, about ninety-five percent of all crimi-
nal convictions are the result of plea deals.67 Also, the criticality of plea ne-
gotiations is not entirely dependent on whether the negotiation takes place 
before or after a formal charge.68 For example, in the Sixth Circuit, if the 
acceptance or rejection of a plea offer would affect whether a defendant 
would be prosecuted in federal court in addition to state court, then the de-
fendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel during those ne-
gotiations, even if they occur prior to the filing of federal charges.69 
Multiple district courts across the country have also held that the at-
tachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during plea negotiations 
can occur pre-charge.70 In Chrisco v. Shafran, the U.S. District Court for the 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (reasoning that the accused has a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during critical pretrial stages, including plea-bargaining); Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (stating that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical 
phase . . . for purposes of the Sixth Amendment”). 
 65 See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373. 
 66 See Frye, 566 U.S. at 143; Moody, 206 F.3d at 616 (Wiseman, J., concurring) (“plea bar-
gaining is central to federal criminal law”). The Frye Court noted that defendants whose cases go 
to trial often receive longer sentences than those who enter into a plea bargain because the longer 
sentences exist for the purpose of facilitating plea-bargains. 566 U.S. at 144. The Frye Court also 
reaffirmed the sentiment that the American criminal justice system is a “system of pleas, not a 
system of trials,” supporting the argument that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical stage 
for a defendant. See id. at 143. 
 67 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006–
STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2010) (finding that 94% of defendants sentenced in state courts pled 
guilty); Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District Courts, SOURCEBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (May 22, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ SOURCEBOOK], 
https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5PP-CMVQ] (finding 
that 97% of sentenced federal defendants pled guilty). 
 68 See United States v. Morris, 470 F.3d 596, 602–03 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim is valid when a defendant was offered a plea deal in state court 
that included the dropping of federal charges, prior to the defendant having been formally charged 
with federal charges). 
 69 See id. (holding that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel when he 
was required to make an immediate decision on a state plea deal, without his attorney present, the 
rejection of which would cause him to be referred to federal court pursuant to a joint state-federal 
taskforce). 
 70 See United States v. Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1267–68 (D. Or. 2010) (holding that a 
defendant has the right to counsel when he is offered a specific plea deal that would require him to 
forfeit his right to a trial pre-indictment); United States v. Busse, 814 F. Supp. 760, 764 (E.D. Wis. 
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District of Delaware relied on Judge Wiseman’s often-cited United States v. 
Sikora dissent to support this position.71 Judge Wiseman, and subsequently 
the district court, reasoned that plea negotiations are evidence, in and of 
themselves, that the government is committed to prosecution, and that ad-
versarial position can be established whether or not the accused is formally 
charged.72 The district court also cited the American Bar Association’s posi-
tion that plea negotiations should be engaged in through defense counsel in 
order to support the court’s finding that counsel should be present during 
plea negotiations, including those that are entered into prior to the filing of 
formal charges.73 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin also recog-
nized the ability for the right to counsel to attach during instances when pre-
charge plea negotiations are entered into by retained counsel.74 Further, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon recognized a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel during pre-charge plea negotiations when the gov-
ernment has established an adversarial position and shown that it is commit-
ted to prosecution.75 
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL SHOULD ATTACH  
DURING PRE-CHARGE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
The bright-line rule, as it is currently interpreted and applied, effective-
ly disenfranchises defendants who are confronted by adversarial proceed-
ings prior to formal charges, such as during pre-charge plea negotiations.76 
Scenarios like these often arise during joint federal-state taskforce prosecu-
                                                                                                                           
1993) (finding that the defendant successfully asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
when the prosecutor engaged in pre-charge plea negotiations with his attorney); Chrisco, 507 
F. Supp. at 1319 (reasoning that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can attach prior to the 
filing of formal charges, including to “plea negotiations which occur prior to the commencement 
of adversary judicial proceedings”). 
 71 Chrisco, 507 F. Supp. at 1319 (citing United States v. Sikora, 635 F.2d 1175, 1180 (6th Cir. 
1980) (Wiseman, J., dissenting)). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS OF GUILTY Standards 14-1.3(a), 
14-3.1(a) (3d ed. 1999) (arguing that defendants should be given an opportunity to retain counsel 
before entering into a guilty plea and prosecuting attorneys are generally expected to engage in 
plea negotiations with defendant’s counsel). 
 74 See Busse, 814 F. Supp. at 763–64 (holding that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel during pre-charge plea negotiations that were entered into with his attorney). 
 75 See Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1267. The court found that the government sufficiently 
established its adversarial position and commitment to prosecution when it told the defendant he 
was going to be indicted and then presented him with a specific plea bargain that would have 
resulted in a prison sentence and surrendering his constitutional right to a trial. Id. 
 76 See Turner I, 848 F.3d 767, 773 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that plea negotiations are a sub-
stantial component of the criminal justice system and defendants are generally ill-equipped to 
handle the plea negotiation process on their own). 
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tions, where plea negotiations can result in deals that involve both state and 
federal charges even though a defendant has only been charged at either the 
state or federal level.77 This is the scenario that played out in Turner v. United 
States (Turner I).78 The criminal justice system relies heavily on plea negotia-
tions, and U.S. Supreme Court precedent does not preclude the inclusion of 
pre-charge plea negotiations as critical stages for the purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 79 This Part will argue that the right to counsel 
extends to pre-charge plea negotiations, and therefore, upon rehearing 
Turner I en banc, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should find 
that the defendant’s right to counsel had attached during the federal plea ne-
gotiations that occurred prior to the defendant being formally charged in fed-
eral court.80 
The plea negotiation process is adversarial, and regardless of whether 
it occurs before or after a defendant is charged, the accused generally does 
not have the legal skill to handle the process on his or her own without the 
assistance of counsel.81 As such, many courts have recognized the bright-
line rule for a defendant’s right to counsel is not in touch with the current 
realities of the criminal justice system’s heavy reliance on plea-
bargaining.82 This rings especially true as pre-indictment plea-bargaining 
becomes more common with the increased use of joint federal-state task 
forces, which can result in initial prosecution in either the state or federal 
court system prior to charges being brought in the other.83 The bright-line 
rule effectively disenfranchises defendants who have not been formally 
charged, but who are nonetheless faced with what some district and circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Mulroy, supra note 41, at 217 & n.28 (noting that the rise in joint federal-state task-
forces has made pre-indictment plea negotiations common in scenarios when a defendant is charged 
in one court system but has not been prosecuted in the other); see, e.g., Turner I, 848 F.3d at 768–69 
(noting that the defendant was charged in state court as a result of a joint federal-state anticrime 
taskforce and was later offered a plea deal for the federal charges prior to the filing of formal fed-
eral charges). 
 78 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 768. 
 79 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 193 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). See gen-
erally Mulroy, supra note 41, at 219–28 (arguing that the proper understanding of Supreme Court 
precedent does not preclude the recognition of the attachment of the right to counsel prior to for-
mal charges). 
 80 See infra notes 81–117 and accompanying text. 
 81 Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773 (finding that defendants cannot be expected to navigate the plea 
bargaining process on their own when the complexity of the federal sentencing guidelines can 
even confound attorneys). 
 82 See id. In Moody, the court concluded that it is obligated to follow precedent, which re-
quired the application of the bright-line rule. United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 614–15 (6th 
Cir. 2000). However, the court stated in dictum that it does not favor the bright-line rule in part 
because the very existence of a plea deal (the government offering a specific sentence for a specif-
ic offense) in and of itself establishes the adverse position of the government, regardless of wheth-
er a formal charge has been filed. See id. at 615–16. 
 83 See Mulroy, supra note 41, at 217 & n.28. 
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courts have appropriately described as adversarial prosecutorial forces.84 In 
scenarios such as the one encountered by the defendant in Turner I, it is an 
injustice to deny an individual counsel when the government enters into 
plea negotiations before filing formal charges.85 
In response to this lack of a right to counsel at a stage considered by 
many in the legal field to be critical, the Sixth Circuit has urged the Su-
preme Court to reconsider the bright-line test for the right to the assistance 
of counsel several times over the past thirty-five years.86 It would not be 
far-fetched for the Supreme Court to do so either.87 The Supreme Court has 
previously held that the assistance of counsel is a guaranteed right when 
adversarial proceedings have begun against the accused; proceedings that 
will ultimately seal their fate.88 Plea negotiations often lead to a plea deal, 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773; Moody, 206 F.3d at 615–16; Chrisco v. Shafran, 507 F. 
Supp. 1312, 1319 (D. Del. 1981) (observing that plea bargaining indicates the government’s 
commitment to prosecution, which combined with the importance of counsel during those negotia-
tions can trigger the right to counsel because the negotiations indicate the adverse position of the 
government comparable to that of when formal charges are filed). In United States v. Wilson, the 
prosecutor engaged in pre-indictment negotiations with the defendant’s attorney and later testified 
that it would have been “unfair” to meet with the defendant without counsel. 719 F. Supp. 2d 
1260, 1267 (D. Or. 2010). The court held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
had attached during the pre-indictment plea negotiation because it would be unjust for the gov-
ernment to later claim the defendant had no right to counsel after conducting plea negotiations that 
solidified the government’s adverse position. See id. 
 85 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773; Moody, 206 F.3d at 615–16; Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 
(finding that a determination that a defendant does not have the right to counsel during pre-
indictment plea negotiations “may be more damaging than a denial of effective assistance at trial 
itself”). In United States v. Busse, the government claimed the defendant had no right to counsel 
when the prosecutor entered into pre-charge plea negotiations with defendant’s attorney. 814 
F. Supp. 760, 763–64 (E.D. Wis. 1993). The court held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel did attach at the time of those negotiations, reasoning that because the government 
and defendant relied on the prosecutor’s representations it would be unjust to later allow the gov-
ernment claim that the negotiations were not adversarial judicial proceedings. See id.; Metzger, 
supra note 49, at 1699 n.228 (acknowledging that finding no right to counsel during pre-charge 
plea bargaining seems unjust). 
 86 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773 (quoting United States v. Sikora, 635 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (Wiseman, J., dissenting) (reiterating that “those persons who enter the plea bargaining 
process before formal charges have been filed should have the protection of the Sixth Amend-
ment” because they are “just as surely faced with the ‘prosecutorial forces of organized society’ as 
the defendant who has been formally introduced to the system”); Moody, 206 F.3d at 618 (Wise-
man, J., concurring) (urging the Supreme Court to reconsider the bright-line rule). 
 87 See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 177 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the 
right to counsel extends to any point where a defendant’s ability to access a fair trial is hindered, 
regardless of whether it is a formal or informal stage); Mulroy, supra note 41, at 219–28 (arguing 
that Supreme Court precedent does not preclude the attachment of the right to counsel prior to the 
filing of a formal charge in certain circumstances). 
 88 See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187 (finding that defendants only have a right to counsel “at or 
after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings”); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 
(1967) (finding that proceedings that “may well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself 
to a mere formality” are critical stages for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment). The historical 
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the result of which will also seal the accused’s fate.89 The Supreme Court 
has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at points that a 
defendant is faced with an adversarial confrontation that can ultimately strip 
him of his liberties.90 Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should 
attach during pre-charge plea negotiations, where a defendant is faced with 
an adversarial confrontation that can deprive him of his right to a trial.91 
Courts have observed that adopting a position that deviates from the 
bright-line rule would be a move away from certainty and clarity by blur-
ring the lines of an otherwise steadfast rule.92 Nonetheless, when a rule con-
sistently has implications antagonistic to justice and fairness, it is an appro-
priate time to reconsider whether that rule continues to be workable.93 
Scholars have recently considered expanding the bright-line rule in re-
sponse to the unjust implications of its rigidity, arguing for included protec-
                                                                                                                           
purpose of the Sixth Amendment was to assure assistance at trial, which has been expanded to 
include certain critical pre-trial prosecutorial proceedings as the criminal justice system evolves. 
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1973). The expansion of the historical interpretation 
of the right to counsel is thus possible when new contexts that could seal the accused’s fate arise. 
See id. at 317 (considering whether to expand the right to counsel to include witness photo identi-
fication). 
 89 See Mulroy, supra note 41, at 222–23. 
 90 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) (finding that the right to counsel is guaran-
teed when the absence of such counsel could inhibit the accused’s right to a fair trial); Wade, 388 
U.S. at 225 (finding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at points “where certain 
rights might be sacrificed or lost”); Sikora, 635 F.2d at 1181 (Wiseman, J., dissenting) (reasoning 
that plea bargains are critical stages because the fundamental right to a trial is at stake); Wilson, 
719 F. Supp. 2d at 1267. 
 91 See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7 (finding that the determination of whether the right to counsel 
has attached requires an analysis of whether the defendant’s rights would be substantially preju-
diced and if counsel would “help avoid that prejudice”); Wade, 388 U.S. at 226 (finding that if the 
accused’s right to a fair trial is at stake he or she has the right to counsel regardless of whether the 
prosecutorial stage is formal or informal); Sikora, 635 F.2d at 1181 (Wiseman, J., dissenting); 
Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1267; Mulroy, supra note 41, at 222–23 (noting that plea negotiations, 
whether pre or post indictment, may lead to a plea that would result in the accused’s forfeiture of 
his or her right to trial). 
 92 See United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 675 (9th Cir. 2000) (reasoning against adding 
pre-indictment proceedings to the bright-line rule, claiming it would no longer make the rule 
“clean and clear”). Steadfast rules enable the Supreme Court to promote uniformity and predicta-
bility among lower courts despite risks associated with inflexibility and potentially arbitrary out-
comes. Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 646 (2014). 
 93 See Ash, 413 U.S. at 310–11, 317 (finding that when the criminal justice system evolves the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel can expand with it); Moody, 206 F.3d at 618 (Wiseman, J., 
concurring) (urging the Supreme Court to reconsider when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches, arguing defendants should be entitled to counsel when faced with “a complicated proce-
dural system and a more knowledgeable adversary” during pre-indictment plea bargaining); see, 
e.g., Montana & Galotto supra, note 49, at 11–12 (arguing that the bright-line rule for the right to 
counsel inadequately protects the accused in pre-indictment stages and thus the Supreme Court 
should consider “freeing” lower courts from its constraints). 
202 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
tions during certain pre-indictment stages.94 The inclusion of pre-charge plea 
negotiations would fit neatly into this category, upholding the valued ability 
for a defendant to retain counsel when faced with a judicial adversary.95 
Many circuit and district courts have interpreted Supreme Court prece-
dent to allow for the attachment of the right to counsel in certain instances 
prior to the filing of formal charges, including pre-indictment plea negotia-
tions.96 Of the courts that have upheld a bright-line rule for the right to 
counsel, some have nevertheless acknowledged the pitfalls of doing so.97 
Justice Stevens in his Gouveia concurrence argued that interpreting prece-
dent as supporting a steadfast bright-line rule would be an unnecessarily 
broad interpretation.98 Justice Stevens argued that it was possible for the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to attach before the filing of formal charges.99 
Additionally, Judge Wiseman of the Sixth Circuit argued in his United States 
v. Sikora dissent for an acknowledgement of pre-charge Sixth Amendment 
rights, arguing that stages such as plea negotiations are critical because of 
what is at stake: the possibility of surrendering constitutional rights or liber-
ties.100 The circuit court in Turner I has previously stated that the plea pro-
cess is adversarial in nature and found fault in the circuit precedent that it 
was obliged to follow.101 Turner I echoed United States v. Moody’s senti-
ments that the bright-line test in these instances is a “triumph of the letter 
over the spirit of the law,” because offering a plea deal is evidence of the 
government’s commitment to prosecution.102 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Mulroy, supra note 41, at 241 (arguing the right to counsel should attach when a prose-
cutor interacts with the accused directly or via counsel about the substance of his or her case); 
Brandon K. Breslow, Signs of Life in the Supreme Court’s Uncharted Territory: Why the Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel Should Attach to Pre-Indictment Plea Bargaining, FED. LAW., 
Oct./Nov. 2015, at 34, 38–39 (arguing that the right to the effective assistance of counsel should 
attach to all plea negotiations, whether they occur pre or post indictment); Montana & Galotto 
supra, note 49, at 12 (arguing the right to counsel should attach at critical pre-indictment stages 
such as during federal plea bargaining). 
 95 See Mulroy, supra note 41, at 227–28, 241. Mulroy argued for an expansion of the bright-
line rule to “include those instances in which a prosecutor has contact with a suspect about the 
substance of the case (other than as a witness), either directly or through counsel.” Id. at 241. 
Mulroy articulates that plea-bargaining clearly falls within this proposed rule. Id. 
 96 See supra notes 50–63, 69–75. 
 97 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773 (refusing to overrule circuit precedent despite acknowledging 
that doing so would mean the accused may have to navigate the pre-indictment plea negotiation pro-
cess on their own); Moody 206 F.3d at 615–16 (raising concerns about the court’s precedential obli-
gation to follow the bright-line approach to the right to counsel because plea negotiations establish 
the adverse position of the government, regardless of whether they occur pre-indictment). 
 98 Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Sikora, 635 F.2d at 1181 (Wiseman, J., dissenting). 
 101 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773 (following circuit precedence despite recognizing the conse-
quences of and inflexibility of a bright-line rule for when the right to counsel attaches). 
 102 Id. at 771. 
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As a result of a plea bargain, the accused may surrender their constitu-
tional right to a trial, and the deciding factor for whether he or she has the 
assistance of competent counsel should not be whether plea negotiations 
occur before or after a formal charge.103 Relying on the presence or absence 
of formal charges as the deciding factor unfairly allows, and perhaps even 
incentivizes, the government to take the opportunity to circumvent constitu-
tional protections.104 Adversarial plea negotiations that occur at times the 
government has shown its commitment to prosecution should be considered 
critical stages for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, and as such, the 
right to counsel should attach, even if it is pre-charge.105 
In Turner I, the court acknowledged the potential injustice of not recog-
nizing a pre-charge right to counsel during plea negotiations.106 There, the 
defendant was already facing conviction on state charges when he was of-
fered a federal plea deal, prior to federal charges having been formally 
filed.107 Two different attorneys represented Turner during the negotiation 
process, and the fact that these two skilled professionals negotiated very dif-
ferent deals shows that the skillset of the negotiator plays an important role in 
the plea-bargain process.108 If the defendant had no right to counsel at this 
stage, he could have faced those negotiations on his own.109 The sentencing 
guidelines are complicated enough for a professional to navigate; it is unrea-
sonable to expect a person without legal training to navigate them alone.110 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189; Moody, 206 
F.3d at 618; Chrisco, 507 F. Supp. at 1319. 
 104 See Busse, 814 F. Supp. at 764; Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (holding that the govern-
ment cannot claim that the defendant had no right to counsel even though the prosecutor did not 
think it would be fair to meet with the defendant without counsel). If there is no right to counsel 
during pre-charge plea negotiations then hypothetically the prosecutor could hold off on charging 
the accused to prolong the period that he or she could legally be without counsel. See Gouveia, 
467 U.S. at 191 (acknowledging that it is a legitimate concern that the government may delay 
formal charges, and therefore the appointment of counsel, to develop its case against the accused, 
but asserting that such an incident would not implicate the right counsel). 
 105 See Sikora, 635 F.2d at 1180 (Wiseman, J. dissenting); Wilson, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1267; 
Busse, 814 F. Supp. at 764; supra notes 76–104 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773. 
 107 Id. at 768–69. 
 108 See id. at 769. A variety of factors can influence the outcome of a plea negotiation, includ-
ing the defense attorney’s personal motivations, their ability to use a negotiation style that is com-
patible with their personality, the amount of effort the attorney is willing to expend, and even the 
defendant’s attitude towards the charge. See generally Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense 
Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995). 
 109 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 769. 
 110 See id. at 773; Moody 206 F.3d at 616 (Wiseman, J., concurring) (observing the complexi-
ty of the sentencing guidelines). The defendant in Turner I cited United States v. Morris to argue 
that there is an exception to the bright-line rule for defendants who enter into plea negotiations 
when faced with both state and federal charges prior to formally being charged in federal court. 
Turner I, 848 F.3d at 772. In Morris, the court found the right to counsel attached when a defend-
ant was offered a plea deal in state court that included dropping federal charges, prior to the de-
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Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has continued to maintain for decades 
that finding no right to counsel in scenarios comparable to Turner I is un-
just.111 The Turner I court even referred to plea negotiations as critical stag-
es of the criminal process, regardless of whether formal charges have been 
filed.112 The court further articulated that the plea negotiation process is ad-
versarial in nature, and the bright-line rule does not take into consideration 
the reality that the criminal justice system heavily relies on plea-bar-
gaining.113 Without a right to counsel at these stages the burden is effective-
ly placed on ill-equipped defendants to fend for themselves against prosecu-
tors.114 Considering that ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are the 
result of a plea deal, it would be unjust to not afford counsel at a time that, 
in and of itself, reflects the government’s commitment to prosecution.115 
Thus, the Sixth Circuit correctly vacated their opinion in Turner I, and the 
court en banc should rule that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had 
attached during the plea negotiations that occurred prior to Turner being 
formally federally charged.116 The U.S. Supreme Court should also consider 
accepting certiorari on this particular matter, if applied for, to clarify that 
the right to counsel attaches during pre-charge plea negotiations.117 
                                                                                                                           
fendant being formally federally charged. United States v. Morris, 470 F.3d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 
2006). The Turner I court distinguished itself from Morris because the plea offered to the defend-
ant in Morris was to determine which court the defendant would be prosecuted in, state or federal, 
compared to Turner I where the defendant was being prosecuted on state and federal charges in-
dependent from one another. Turner I, 848 F.3d at 772. The Turner I court nonetheless recognized 
that this line of reasoning negatively impacts defendants who are facing charges in both federal 
and state courts, because without the assistance of counsel a defendant is forced to navigate the 
complex federal sentencing guidelines on his or her own. Id. at 773. Also, federal-state prosecu-
tions are increasingly more abundant making it more difficult to identify exactly when charges are 
formally filed for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Id. 
 111 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773; Mulroy, supra note 41, at 217 (noting that the Sixth Circuit 
has criticized the bright-line rule it is obliged to uphold). 
 112 Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773. 
 113 Id.; see Mulroy, supra note 41, at 234 (citing Turner I’s position that the bright-line rule is 
out of touch with the realities of the modern criminal justice system as an explanation for why 
many circuits have departed from the rule). 
 114 See Turner I, 848 F.3d at 773; Metzger, supra note 49, at 1666–68 (arguing that the bright-
line rule cannot guarantee fairness for individuals who engage in pre-charge plea negotiations, and 
that those who do so without counsel may unwittingly harm their case going forward when faced 
with a prosecutor who holds significantly more legal knowledge).  
 115 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012); Moody, 206 F.3d at 615–16; Sikora, 635 
F.2d at 1181 (Wiseman, J., dissenting); DOJ SOURCEBOOK, supra note 67. 
 116 See supra notes 76–115 and accompanying text. 
 117 See Moody, 206 F.3d at 618 (Wiseman J., concurring). See supra notes 76–113 and ac-
companying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to re-
hear Turner v. United States could result in the overruling of the Circuit’s 
precedential adherence to the bright-line rule and allow for the recognition 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches to pre-charge plea nego-
tiations. If so, it would be an example of a circuit court expressly recogniz-
ing a Sixth Amendment right to pre-charge counsel, and not just the possi-
bility of that right. Regardless of Turner’s final outcome, this is an issue that 
would be ripe for the U.S. Supreme Court to consider. It is in the interest of 
fairness and justice for both the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court to rec-
ognize the right to counsel during pre-charge plea negotiations. During these 
negotiations, a defendant is faced with the adversarial forces of the judicial 
system and, without counsel, would be left to navigate sentencing guidelines 
and adversarial confrontations without any prior relevant knowledge or skills. 
When an individual is faced with an adversarial foe (the government) look-
ing to exchange a particular sentence for a certain offense, there is sufficient 
evidence to support the proposition that the government is committed to 
prosecution. To assert otherwise would be to say that the government 
spends its time and resources engaging in plea-bargain conversations with 
individuals whom it is not seriously considering prosecuting. Considering 
that ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are the result of plea nego-
tiations, it is likely that the government engages in plea-bargaining because 
it is the most efficient method of obtaining convictions; and the accused 
should have the right to counsel during the process through which the sig-
nificant majority of defendants are convicted and ultimately forgo their con-
stitutional right to a trial. 
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